distinguishing between the United States and Coca-Cola."3 When a magazine wanted three objects for a photograph that were peculiarly American it selected: a baseball, a hot dog, and a bottle of Coke. This softdrink originated in Atlanta during the 1880s as a quasi-medicinal, yet refreshing, non-alcoholic beverage. From the beginning the drink was associated with mass advertising, a high consumption society, and free enterprise. Since the softdrink satisfied no essential need, the CocaCola Company used extensive advertising: signs, special delivery trucks, articles like calendars and lamps that carried the distinctive trademark, radio commercials, and slogans such as "The Pause that
Refreshes." The company carefully cultivated an image for its product:
Coke was wholesome and pleasant. And the company's history exemplified the virtues of free enterprise. Robert Woodruff, the company's longtime president, once remarked that within every bottle was "the essence of capitalism." The founders of Coca-Cola became rich, powerful, and famous. Top company executives claimed presidents of the United States as friends. Up to the 1920s, however, the company confined its sales largely to North America. Only then did it begin to reach out for opportunities abroad.
The richest new markets lay in Europe, Latin America, and the Pacific. The Coca-Cola Export Corporation founded in 1930 handled overseas business and was soon operating in some twenty-eight countries. Technological advance (such as finding a way to concentrate the syrup which was the basis of the drink) facilitated exports. The Export Corporation normally employed a franchise system that allowed foreign nationals to own and operate bottling subsidiaries. Local interests provided capital, materials, and staff-almost everything except the concentrate-when they signed a contract to become a Coca-Cola bottler. The mother company helped the new bottling franchise get started and supervised product quality and advertising, while nonAmericans operated the franchise and earned the bulk of the profits. It was an ingenious system that minimized the Atlanta company's participation and furthered the product's rapid expansion.
In Europe this early multinational had made only a modest start by 1939, but the Second World War proved to be a boon. Woodruff stated the company's wartime policy: "We will see that every man in uniform gets a bottle of Coca-Cola for five cents wherever he is and whatever it costs."4 The distinctive Coke bottle accompanied the GI into war. Company employees were assigned as "technical observers" to the military in order to take charge of new bottling plants set up close to the front lines. Coca-Cola, to some GIs, became identified with American war aims. One soldier wrote home: "To my mind, I am in this damn mess as much to help keep the custom of drinking Cokes as I am to help preserve the million other benefits our country blesses its citizens with."5 As a result of the war, two-thirds of the veterans drank Coke, and sixty-four bottling plants had been ferried abroad, most at government expense. The next step was to mount a systematic campaign for the European market.
The late 1940s saw Coca-Cola expand rapidly on the continent. that the peoples of Europe, Asia, and Africa "look to the American nation to lead them out of difficulties. They look to us for loans, for raw materials, and assistance." Farley was a militant anti-Communist who, in 1950, warned: "We find ourselves in danger from an enemy more subtle, more ruthless, more fanatic than any we have ever faced.
The time has come for Americans to challenge the aggressive, godless, 4Watters, Coca-Cola, 162. Almost everywhere in postwar Europe Coca-Cola's arrival provoked opposition. In many cases local beverage interests tried to block the entry of the American softdrink. In Belgium and Switzerland, they challenged the drink with law suits alleging it contained a dangerous amount of caffeine. In Denmark breweries managed to ban the drink temporarily. In most cases the local Communist party led the opposition, describing the drink as an addictive drug or even a poison. In Italy L'Unita warned parents that Coke could turn children's hair white. Austrian Communists asserted that the new bottling plant at Lambach could easily be transformed into an atomic bomb factory. These disturbances were trivial compared to the controversy that erupted when Coca-Cola arrived after 1945 in France.
In France the first bottles of Coca-Cola had been sold to American servicemen in 1919. Yet, except for some cafes in major cities that catered to American tourists, the beverage was rarely served in France during the 1920s and 1930s. With the war, sales stopped altogether. After the war the American firm tried to resume operations but encountered difficulties because potential bottlers lacked equipment and the dollars to import the concentrate from the United States. To overcome these obstacles Coca-Cola Export orchestrated an American-style marketing plan for France. The key was the construction of a new manufacturing plant in Marseille to produce the concentrate. A small fraction of this concentrate, the ingredients used for blending the secret formula called "7X," was to be imported from the United States. To promote sales the country was divided into zones with the Paris region and the Midi targeted for initial operations. The company began signing contracts for bottling franchises and allocated a large budget for advertising. Within a few years, it was projected, each French citizen would consume six bottles of Coke annually. The concessionaires were to employ American sales and distribution techniques including new trucks brightly painted in company colors, free tasting, and endorsements from cinema and sports stars. The American multinational construed this strategy as a resumption of prewar operations, but this was rather disingenuous: before 1939 business consisted of one bottler, who imported syrup from the United States, and distribution was limited to cafes in principal cities. warned that the drink could stimulate "addiction analagous to that observed in the use of drugs and tobacco" which was why, supposedly, the company encouraged free tasting. 14 Wine wholesalers asked that CocaCola conform to the health code imposed on all French beverages and complained about American customs' regulations on wine and liquors which "may explain, if not justify, the often bitter remarks heard in France when an American beverage enjoys free entry."'" None of these interests openly demanded a ban on Coca-Cola, but they insisted that the product submit to existing French health regulations. Payments aside, the ministry called the bottling contracts "draconian" because they placed control in the hands of the Atlanta company and assured it the lion's share of profits. And when the ministry tried to 13 Climats, 25 March 1950. 14 Libration paysanne, 1 December 1949. force Coca-Cola Export to relinquish control over its Marseille plant to French interests, the Americans refused.'8 The rue de Rivoli also suspected that the beverage, which made loyal consumers after a few drinks, might be addictive either because of its caffeine or because of some secret ingredient. Politically, the ministry warned, the government should expect "extremely brutal reactions" from the winegrowers, fruitjuice, and mineral water interests who believed they could not match the advertising and financial reserves of the Yankee newcomer. Such reactions would provide "powerful arguments to adversaries of the current majority."'9 Authorizing Coca-Cola, treasury officials implied, would only aid those who charged the government was subservient to America.
Other government bureaucracies were also suspicious of CocaCola. Starting in 1922, the beverage had faced a series of legal actions brought by customs officials and by the department for the repression of frauds, an agency of the agriculture ministry. At issue were alleged violations of the health code and deceptive labeling. These charges reached a climax in 1942 when a court dismissed the indictment by ordering a non-lieu (no cause for prosecution) which seemed to close the case. Yet after the war these legal tests resumed, and officials pursued them so eagerly that Makinsky complained that the French administration had a "personal grudge against us."20
The incumbent government, that of Georges Bidault (October 1949 to July 1950), rested on a centrist coalition of MRP (Mouvement Republicain Populaire), Radical, and Conservative Parties and enjoyed Socialist support (until February 1950) . Like other centrist governments of the years 1948-51 who tied their fate to the Atlantic alliance, Bidault's ministers felt trapped. On the one hand, it was essential to maintain good relations with Washington, especially if France expected generous treatment under the Marshall Plan. On the other hand, Bidault faced demands from some of his own ministries, the Communist party, and the beverage lobby to block a multinational that virtually symbolized the American way. Admitting Coca-Cola seemed, from Bidault's perspective, to be a trivial issue and one that should not jeopardize American aid. Yet the government bent to domestic pressures and tried to muddle through the affair. French officials sought to get the softdrink classified as a pharmaceutical. After all, it was argued, Coca-Cola had once advertised itself as a tonic. In the United States and elsewhere, Coca-Cola had won exemptions from local regulations requiring disclosure in order to protect the secrecy of "7X." Finally there was a lingering dispute over the trademark. "Coca", it was charged, was deceptive because coca leaves were not truly present and thus the trademark misrepresented the product.
Of all these charges, it was the presence of caffeine and phosphoric acid that caused Makinsky's staff the most difficulty because they seemingly placed the softdrink in violation of the 1905 code. Under the existing code, Makinsky privately acknowledged, Coke was "pretty vulnerable."24 The wine, fruit juice, and other domestic beverage lobbies joined the department of frauds in its suits. Once begun, these court actions assumed a life of their own marked by hearings, wrangling, and contested scientific tests. To add to the Atlanta company's worries, the Ministry of Agriculture appointed a special advisory committee, which contained experts known to be hostile to the softdrink, for the purpose of clarifying the code on non-alcoholic drinks. One such expert, an eighty-year-old doctor, told company officials: "Even if you prove to me that in 2000 cases Coca-Cola was quite harmless, this will not mean -that in the 2001st case it will not be detrimental to a child's health."
And a former professor of hygiene, who also advised the government, told a wine conference that "every Frenchman who wants to be healthy trade agreements with the United States by discriminating against a specific product. His bill assigned responsibility for determining whether or not the beverage was harmful to the minister of public health, who would act on the advice of experts from the Conseil superieur de l'hygiene publique and the Academie nationale de medecine.
Rather than openly defend the winegrowers, Boulet masqued his purpose by stressing the probability that Coca-Cola was injurious to public health. That the Coca-Cola Company paraded its product's alleged wholesomeness and directed its appeal at youthful consumers seemed to Boulet and his supporters to be especially insidious. Boulet's project attracted far greater support than that of the Communists. The latter, preferring a disguised ban to no ban at all, supported Boulet, as did some MRP legislators as well as many deputies representing rural constituencies.
The government's spokesman in the National Assembly was the minister of public health, Pierre Schneiter, who like Premier Bidault and Boulet, was a member of the pro-American MRP. The government did not want a ban on Coca-Cola, and Schneiter insisted that the Boulet proposal was unnecessary because existing legislation was adequate to protect national health in the event the drink were found to be harmful or fraudulent. The minister of health said the government had no precise stand on the issue and tried to make light of the affair: "I would rather trust in the common sense of the country where we have always known how to choose the beverage that suits our taste and generally drink it under reasonable conditions."27 Nevertheless, the government chose not to oppose the majority of the National Assembly, which included elements of the MRP, over the issue. Schneiter left the decision to the will of the assembly knowing that at worst the legislation gave the government the authority to act, but did not mandate it.
Opponents of Coca-Cola urged immediate action by the National Assembly, but the government managed to postpone debate until February 1950.28 The assembly then rejected the Communist proposal for an outright ban, but it adopted Boulet's bill by voice vote. According to the legislation, if the experts found a non-alcoholic beverage made of vegetable matter injurious to public health, the minister of public health was empowered to ban it. The assembly submitted to the pressure of special interests, the Communist party, and a small contingent of MRP and Gaullist deputies. The bulk of the deputies who acquiesced probably recognized that, given its stand, the government was unlikely to invoke the ban: thus they could risk giving a sop to the interested parties. And resisting Coca-Cola was a way of expressing latent batch of concentrate to its French bottlers. Still trying to discourage the Americans, the government imposed a de facto embargo that thwarted the company's gambit of importing concentrate from Casablanca.
Surveying the opposition in early 1950, Makinsky concluded there was a formidable array of enemies that were "trying to 'get' us." They included not only the domestic beverage lobbies, the administration, the Communists, and parliament, but also French public opinion. The Paris chief of Coca-Cola Export thought the French were "as a whole anti-American" chiefly because they resented being dependent on the United States.30 But the Atlanta company had the will, the resources, and the influence to retaliate. It feared the precedent should its product be banned in France.
Coca-Cola Export relied on its legal staff, hired expert scientific advisers, and used its contacts within the French administration, including the prime minister's office and the Conseil superieur de l'hygiene publique, to make its case. Those involved in the legal proceedings as well as legislators received memoranda outlining the company's arguments. This documentation stressed that the softdrink was being sold freely in seventy-six countries; that previous investigations proved it conformed to the health code; that its advertising campaign would be neither excessive nor provocative; that the manufacture and sale of the beverage were in French hands; that virtually all the supplies, from the sugar to the delivery trucks, were to be purchased in France; that experience showed its sales did not harm the markets of traditional drinks; and, especially, that there was no connection between Coca-Cola and the Marshall Plan.3' In addition, the multinational took its case directly to the French government. Farley visited the French ambassador, Henri Bonnet, and, after accusing the government with harassing the company for political reasons, asked the foreign office to persuade the finance ministry and the cabinet to end the embargo.32
The Atlanta company also sought the intervention of the United States government. Makinsky asked the State Department to intervene, charging Paris with "discrimination, hostility, and unjustifiable delaying tactics" and threatened to withdraw Coca-Cola's business from France.33 The State Department, after trying to stay aloof from fear of linking Coca-Cola with American aid, acted. David Bruce, the Ameri- France is under a solemn obligation to the United States, as a matter of honor and gratitude for our having saved her independence in two terrible wars, and our having expended so much American wealth for her sake in peacetime, to refrain from enacting any measure . that would disclose to us . . . that she is unmindful of America's immeasurable sacrifices and generosity.37
Another journal cast the affair as part of the global ideological The international quarrel over Coca-Cola subsided as quickly as it had begun. Before 1950 was over, the affair, at least for politicians, officials, and the press, became passe. In June the Conseil de la Republique reviewed and unanimously rejected the assembly's proposed regulation of non-alcoholic beverages. The upper house found Boulet's proposal unnecessary and prejudicial to relations with the United States. In general the senators took a more dispassionate view of the affair than the lower house. Leo Hamon remarked: "When it's a question of beverages, it's wise to trust the palates of the French and it's desirable to conserve our energy for more serious issues."49 Another senator noted that the assembly's bill made France seem singularly "disagreeable" after accepting so much American aid, and he denounced the cowardly approach to banning the drink: "It's not worthy of France and will be no honor in the annals of parliament." The Conseil's rejection forced a second reading of the bill in the assembly which promptly passed the regulation again making it law. The so-called "Anti-CocaCola" bill, which authorized the government, acting on the advice of the Conseil superieur de l'hygiene publique and the Academie nationale de medecine, to draw-up regulations for beverages made from vegetable extracts, became law in August 1950. But the experts procrastinated in setting standards, and subsequent centrist governments delayed issuing new regulations based on the Boulet bill.
In 1951 the Ministry of Agriculture issued its interpretation of the health code and concluded that the softdrink conformed to French law. But the Ministry of Public Health balked. Farley blamed Communist officials in the health bureaucracy for its continued obstructionism while the ministry refused to relent until the legal actions were settled.50 After a series of scientific tests of the drink's ingredients found it to be neither fraudulent nor in violation of the existing code, a magistrate ordered a non-lieu in September 1952. The department for the repression of frauds, which had initiated the suit, accepted the decision, but the wine and fruit juice interests appealed and forced yet further tests, which again cleared the drink. Finally in December 1953 an appeals court confirmed the non-lieu which terminated legal action. Coca-Cola was found to be free from violating all existing codes, and the company was convinced the Boulet legislation was not a serious threat. 51 Coca-Cola Export rejoiced in its "handsome victory," but re- 
